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" 77?e greatest common property that we have is the earth itself" 
Takashi Fujii 1992 
I Introduction 
This paper presents an attempt to relate a number of paradigms or perspec-
tives in economics to the notion of 'sustainable development' (SD) and how this 
notion is (to be) operationalised. 
Several economie paradigms have emerged from classical economics as it 
was practiced in the past century (or "politica! economy" as it was then called), 
especially: neoclassical economics (the "mainstream"), institutional/evolutionary 
economics (and some other forms of post-classical political economics). After 
looking at the main features of some of these paradigms we shall ask if and where 
they fail and whether and how that could be remedied. 
What SD is, or has been taken to be, is discussed in section 2; the para-
digms and their views on SD are given in 3; in section 4 I shall try to show some 
implications in terms of what these views mean for the choice of performance 
indicators on the economy-environment interface, and in terms of instruments 
recommended for environmental or sustainable development policies. 
II Sustainable Development as a Challenge 
JU. Sustainable Development 
'Sustainable development'(SD) is proposed as a guiding principle for 
economie development planning (IUCN 1980, WCED 1987, UNCED 1992) in both 
developing and industrialised countries. lts most widespread definition is: develop-
ment that satisfies present needs without compromising the abil'rty of future 
generations to meet their needs (WCED 1987). 
In this descriptions, there is no direct or exclusive reference to ecological 
viability. Rather, the emphasis is on the phenomenon of 'development* or growth. 
WCED does refer to the notion of limitations on the environment's capacity to meet 
present and future needs, but it sees these limitations as imposed mainly by the 
state of technology and social organization: "In essence, SD is a process of change 
in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation 
of technological development, and institutional change are all in harmony and 
enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations 
(WCED, p.46). This basically reflects an economists' approach to the notion of SD: 
it is the level of human welfare that is to be sustained, or perpetuated, through 
economie, institutional and technical change. "Sustainable development is non-
declining welfare per capita..." (Pearce 1994). 
Others qualify this by focusing on the 'physicaP basis (i.e. the natural re-
sources) of the economy. They often infer, that SD implies such a distribution 
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over time of aggregate resource stocks, that at no future point of time the potentiai 
of this stock to generate welfare, is below the current potentiai (e.g. Pearce 1986, 
Jacobs 1985, Repetto 1986). This implies the maintenance or even improvement of 
the main life support systems, essential ecological processes, and species diversity 
(IUCN 1980). This approach could be labelled the environmental approach, in 
contrast with a purely economie one. Here, economie development is defined as 
sustainable if: 
(i) the environmental impacts in consequence of it do not impair the functio-
ning of resource regeneration systems, waste absorption systems and the systems 
supporting flows of other environmental services and goods, and 
(ii) when use of nonrenewable resources is compensated for by at least 
equivalent increases in supplies of renewable or reproducible substitutes (Opschoor 
1992). Sustainability thus defined means that, ceteris paribus, the interactions 
between the economy and the ecology can be continued qualitatively and quantita-
tively at least the current levels (see Par. II.5 for qualifications); "it leaves the world 
as rich in resources and opportunities as it inherited" (Beguin-Austin, 1993:8). 
II.2 Environment as Infrastructure for Development 
Underlying the concern over ecological sustainability, is the notion that the 
environment provides an infrastructure without which the economy could not 
survive: ultimately, all material (including energy) transformed by productive 
activities into goods and services providing satisfaction, originate in nature. These 
flows will have to continue, and that implies that a great number of ecological 
systems and processes ("life support systems") are to remain in operation and 
even be reinforced: biogeochemical cycles will have to continue circulating com-
pounds through the biosphere; ecosystems are to remain capable of assimilating 
and breaking down pollution; resources such as fish populations, forests, soils, are 
to remain capable of renewing themselves or to be renewed, etc; the biosphere is 
to remain a habitat to Homo sapiens providing shelter (eg, protection against UV 
radiation) and amenities (eg, landscapes, scenery and biotic diversity as such) that 
directly. These are examples of the 'infrastructural functions' of the environment. 
Below, we shall focus on the infrastructural and instrumental functions of nature, 
and assume that its integrity (in terms of species diversity and the associated 
diversity and size of biotopes) is maintained at accepted levels (see Hl.3). 
Given those levels, given the patterns and levels of the economie activities 
and their environmental impacts, and given the prevailing state of science and 
technology, the environment provides a range of resources and services (all to be 
referred to below as: resources), that can be imagined as a multidimensional 
'environmental utilization space' or EUS (Siebert 1982; Opschoor 1987, 1992). The 
EUS is defined as the locus of points (representing rates of exploitation of renewa-
ble resources and rates of pressure on assimilation systems) that lead to non-
negative changes over time of environmental quality and resource stocks. If 
economie activities generate claims on the environment that exceed the limits of the 
environmental space, then the biosphere's (future) capacity to satisfy human needs 
is affected adversely. Welfare economists might refer to the EUS as an "environ-
mental utilization possibilities frontier". The environmental utilization space is in 
danger of shrinking (especially on a per capita basis), unless technological innovati-
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on and (inter)national resource utilization management and related policies can be 
dramatically speeded up. Daly (1972) has referred to the limited capacity of the 
biosphere to set limits to the 'scale' of the economy; as a metaphor for this 
capacity he used the concept of a 'Plimsoll line'. This is exactly what the notion of 
EUS captures and represents: the EUS is the multidimensional set of relevant 
Plimsoll lines for ecologically sustainable environmental pressures by the economy. 
The notion of an EUS suggests the need to develop in operational terms a 
corresponding set of (physical) sustainabiiity indicators, and it entails the need to 
search for strategies and instruments that curb the levels of economie activities to 
remain within the EUS. 
II.3 How much Environmental Infrastructure to Maintain? 
The ecological aspect of sustainable development appears to be a fairly 
objective and tangible one, but this is not quite so. In order to render it truly 
operational, several a priori choices have to be made. These choices have to do, 
inter alia, with (i) whether one allows for more or less substitutability of natural and 
anthropogenic resources, (ii) how much consideration one allows for intrinsic 
values of other species, and (iii) what risks one is prepared to take when it comes 
to environmental impacts. These issues will be discussed below. 
Weak or strono Sustainabiiity 
Maler (1990) refers to development as sustainable, \..if the total stock of 
resources -human capital, physical reproducible capital, environmental resources, 
exhaustible resources- does not decrease over time" (cf. Solow 1986). Pearce and 
Turner (1990) take SD to mean: "...maximising the net benefits of economie 
development, subject to maintaining the services and the quality of natural resour-
ces over time" (see also my own definition, in 11.1). Maler's definition allows for 
substitution between the various kinds of capital (produced, human, natural capital) 
and accepts a dwindling of natural resources as long as it is compensated by 
extensions of physical and/or human capital that is not accepted if one follows the 
definition given here or that of Pearce and Turner. The Maler/Solow-position has 
been referred to as "weak sustainabiiity"; the other position (adopted here) has 
been labelled "strong sustainabiiity". These positions reflect a difference in assump-
tions over the degree of substitutability of the different factors of production on the 
economie process at large. Economists would recognise this as a difference in the 
assumed form of the production function: one with variable technical coefficients 
and hence substitution (weak sustainabiiity) as against one with fixed coefficients 
and hence no substitution between natural and man-made factors of production 
(strong sustainabiiity). Note that strong sustainabiiity according to the defmitions by 
Opschoor and Pearce and Turner does imply the possibility of substitution and 
compensation within the category of natural capital. That is, within the portfolio of 
natural capital, several assets may substitute for one another and the loss of 
specific assets at specific locations may in principle also be compensated by 
reconstructing them (or developing substitutes) elsewhere. Of course one could 
envisage situations where natural assets can indeed be replaced by produced ones 
without loss in sustainabiiity for the system as a whole. The World Bank basically 
adopts a weak approach bot allows for constraints in the cases of irreversible 
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environmental changes and loss of biodiversity. 
Here, again, a relatively strong position is assumed, as environmental life 
support systems and produced capital are to be regarded as complementary rather 
than substitutable and socioeconomic development depends on both (Opschoor 
and Reijnders 1991; Costanza 1992; Folke 1992); this position gains credibility 
when one considers how little is actually known about the factual elasticities of 
substitution and when one observes ecologists' concerns (see also Pearce 1994). 
An Ecocentric or Anthropocentric Approach 
Another choice nas to do with the domain of the notion of sustainability: is it 
to encapsulate only human interests, or are we to concern ourselves also with the 
prospects of species other than homo sapiens and maybe even of ecosystems? 
In the first case, we use a narrow, human interest oriented definition of sustaina-
bility; in the latter case sustainability is regarded from some ecocentric point of 
view, i.e. one takes a wide view. In the narrow view, the value of biodiversity is 
derived only form the significance of it in economie terms. That is, species and 
ecosystems diversity may have a value based on their various ecological functions 
in terms of providing a carrying capacity for humans or for human activity, they 
may have a value as they directly or potentially enter into production functions or 
utility functions, etc. Others acknowledge that species may have existence rights 
independent of their instrumental values. It is assumed below, that any concerns 
over other species' "stakes" will be taken into account by constraining our collective 
use of natural resources by setting aside (e.g. through zoning) parts of them in the 
'interest' of these species and ecosystems. 
A Risk Takina or Precautionarv Approach 
There also is the problem that it is often unknown what is (un)sustainable. 
There is true uncertainty about many aspects of the significance of ecological 
processes; e.g. It is unknown how earth systems (such as climate) will behave 
when human interference w'rth these systems brings them in states beyond ranges 
that these systems have ever been in before. Also there is the stochastic nature of 
many of the processes that actually determine the biospheric carrying capacity for 
human pressure. Views on the magnitude of this carrying capacity thus also 
depend on one's attitudes toward risks and uncertainties. A fair and prudent asses-
sment of the extent of the environmental utilization space may leave much less 
room for economie development than an anthropocentric and risk accepting one. 
The Rio Declaration (UN 1992) advocated a precautionary approach. In practical 
terms this means that, where standards must be set as constraints on economie 
development, a risk aversive position is adopted and the so-called "safe minimum 
standards approach" will be favoured. 
II.4 Do Sustainable Development Paths Exist? 
Sustainability of development entails that three conditions are met simultane-
ously: (i) environmental or ecological viability (i.e. the observance of the need to 
maintain the environmental infrastructure); (ii) economie viability (i.e. constant or 
rising per capita welfare levels); (iii) social viability (reduction of inequality, enhan-
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cement of human capital and social investment). Together, these three constraints 
may demarcate an empty set in terms of strategies or pathways towards such a 
sustainable economy. In other words, there may be trade offs to be made between 
ecological sustainability and its implications in terms of current consumption levels. 
It may even be that the only conceivable pathways towards sustainability imply the 
need to cut down drastically the consumption and/or production in certain regions, 
or, alternatively, to reduce population growth. Such strategies might meet with 
strong ethical or political objections. In order to ensure that ways to achieve 
sustainability exist, I propose that: 
- sustainability does not have to be reached overnight, or: the process of change 
as proposed by WCED may take some decades to be realised and different 
regions may have differentiated responsibilities in terms of the time horizons within 
which to achieve regional sustainability; 
- sustainability implies a preferential treatment of the poor in terms of their 
enhanced access to the environmental utilisation space; in other words, the North 
and the elites in the South may have to move in order to make space for the 
underprivileged. 
11.5 Market Mechanisms and Sustainability 
Valuation of Environmental Capital Stocks 
The environmental infrastructure discussed above can be regarded as "envi-
ronmental capital", the revenue or interest of which essentially is the EUS. Environ-
mental capital has been defined as the aggregate net present value of the various 
resources in an economy's resource base. Let us assume that 'nature' is made up 
of a set of separable entities e(i), available at level E(i), and that for each unit of e(i) 
a net present value of v(i) exists. Environmental capital C would then be the 
summed product of v(i) and E(i). Above, we have questioned the assumptions of 
separability and unrelatedness of the various e(i), but even apart from that a large 
number of problems with respect to resource base valuation remain, especially 
when it comes to using such valuations as guidelines for the rates of exploita-
tion/exhaustion of these resources. 
The first problem is, whose valuations or preferences are to determine the 
v(i)'s and with what intensities. Are individual valuations weighed according to 
income or purchasing power, or is a more egalitarian determination process 
envisaged? Do we look at the present generation's assessments only or should 
future generations at least codetermine the v(i)'s? If future generations' preferences 
are to count, then what time horizon is appropriate, and how much weight should 
be given to each generation? Any set of answers on these questions deviating 
from: "present generation's preferences weighed according to purchasing power 
and the going rate of time preference", leads to the need to setting some kind of 
social or 'solidarity' value s(i), with typically s(i)>v(i). The alternative to determining 
such s(i)'s would be to have society decide over the time distribution of minimum 
levels of E(it)'s, over some relevant planning period. 
The second problem relates to the base of the individual v(i)'s. Neoclassical 
environmental economics has yielded a variety of aspects that individuals have to 
take into account. The value of an e(i) to an individual is the sum of his/her user 
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benefits and nonuser benefits. The user benefits are composed of the net market 
value of the e(i), the user's welfare surplus on it, and the option value that the 
individual places on retaining the option of use of the e(i) in future. The nonuser 
benefits reflect the individual's preference for leaving a certain e(i) available to future 
generations' use ('bequest value), and his estimate of the 'existence value' or 
intrinsic value of keeping e(i) on the planet, even if it will have no use value ever. 
Purely functionalist and egotistic individuals would only count the user benefits. The 
bequest values reflect the individuals' positions vis-a-vis the preferred level of 
intergenerational solidarity; the existence values reflect individuals' positions vis-a-
vis nature conservation quite apart from any use related benefit. It will be obvious 
that nonuser values are hard to determine empirically. However, there are more 
fundamental problems associated with them: (i) society as a whole may take a 
different view as to the collective bequest value of an e(i) on the basis of a different 
solidarity weighing (as we saw); and (ii) society may have a different view of 
existence values or even user values of certain e(i)'s on 'merit grounds' (Opschoor 
1974, James et al 1978, Siebert 1987). The latter means that individuals simply are 
not accepted as the sole and best judges of the societal value of the elements of 
the environmental infrastructure; societies taking that position will either have to 
determine 'merit values' m(i) (with, typically, m(i)>v(i)), or decide on the signifi-
cance of these merit considerations for the time distribution of the minimal levels of 
E0t). 
Finally, working with v(i)'s, s(i)'s or m(i)'s implies the assumption that 
individuals or society as a whole are capable of projecting all different types or 
aspects of value on a single plane, where these aspects can be aggregated into 
one single value parameter ('welfare', or 'utility', typically expressed in monetary 
terms). The approach suggested above, i.e. that of safe standards to ensure the 
survival of certain minima in terms of life support systems or ecological infrastruc-
ture (and habitat for other species) implies that decisions vis-a-vis the rate of using 
or running down a single resource stock or even environmental capital as a whole, 
cannot be determined on efficiency grounds and values alone; one-dimensional 
comparisons of costs and benefits may then be unacceptable as the sole decision 
aids to be used and tradeoff analysis, multicriteria analysis and other non-economic 
techniques may be more appropriate. 
The various paradigms take different stances on these questions. 
One important mechanism for disclosing values is the market mechanism. 
Given the almost exclusive role attached to that mechanism in this respect, it is 
important to explore to what degree it is capable of generating correct signals in 
terms of values. Of course this has to do with the discussion on v(i), s(i) or m(i) 
above. 
INSTITUTIQNAL CAUSES OF UNSUSTAINABILITY 
Economie activities are the most manifest sources of environmental stress: 
they are based on extracted raw materials and energy, they pollute, and they imply 
spatial claims damaging the integrity of natural environments. This stress is a 
problem only in so far as environmental buffering capacities are exceeded and this 
excess is not compensated by remedial activities. Economie activities are the 
substrates and manifestations of larger societal processes, tendencies, urges and 
drives. Amongst these there are three that have, since the early '70s, been singled 
out as the alleged main causes of environmental destruction: population growth , 
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economie growth , inappropriate technological change). But we have to dig deeper 
yet. Behind the forces mentioned, there are some more structural causal mecha-
nisms at work, such as: predominant cultural a priori's and world views (including 
views of humankind-nature relationships; see e.g. O'Riordan 1981, Opschoor 
1989), poverty (see notably WCED 1987) and institutional failure to accommodate 
to the emerging environmental realities ( see e.g. O'Riordan 1981; Opschoor 1990). 
This paragraph boks at this latter cause of unsustainability in particular. By instituti-
ons I mean: all 'arrangements' (both formal and informal ones) and social conventi-
ons and patterns of conduct, including economie mechanisms such as the market 
and market regulating structures. Unsustainability when looked at from an institutio-
nal angle, can be attributed to several kinds of failures in the decision making 
processes that direct the course of economie developments. We refer to them by 
using the terms for failures in OECD discussions (e.g. OECD 1990): government 
failures and market failures. 
Government Failures 
Government failures can be divided into policy failures and administrative 
failures1. One speaks of policy failures when prevalent policies are based on past 
decisions in which ecological or environmental considerations were given insuffi-
ciënt weight. The latter very often is the case with sectoral policies where sectoral 
interests and powers have predominated over, or excluded ecological considerati-
ons, or with policies dating back to periods of time when environmental problems 
were not yet perceived fully. Examples are: policies in the areas of agriculture, 
energy, transportation. One may also speak of policy failure when policy is directed 
at enhancing economie growth per se, that is, disregarding social and ecological 
repercussions of the growth paths that these policies imply. Thirdly, one may speak 
of policy failures when national or international policy fails in developing adequate 
institutional checks on market failures (see below). 
Very often past sectoral policies (e.g. in the field of energy, agriculture and 
transportation) in many countries and regions at least in the North, have been 
decided upon primarily with the sectoral interests in mind, at best with conside-
ration for trade offs vis-a-vis other established sectors. Environmental concerns 
have not been appropriately internalised. Apart from this, not only private sector 
but also public sector decision makers have limited time horizons and/or discount 
future consequences of present decisions. Thus, policy formation may suffer from 
biases towards stronger (in terms of economie and politica! power or significance) 
sectors and against interests that cannot manifest themselves on markets and in 
xThe notion of administrative failures refers to a range of problems 
within the organization of government at the various levels, leading to 
inadequate policy formulation and/or inadequate policy implementation. 
Examples include: rigidities due to entrenched traditional divisions of 
labour within administrative organizations (very often along sectoral 
lines), high time preference even within governmental organizations, 
insufficiënt integration between agencies and departments, Instruments or 
powers insufficiënt to achieve policy objectives, lack of instruments or 
powers to ensure policy implementation within the economie processes. 
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the political arena, such as future generations' interests. Sectoral policv faiiure (as 
this may be called) may result in the subsidisation of sectoral activities so that 
prices no longer reflect even private costs. In resource related sectors such as 
agriculture, water, timber and energy, this leads to artificially low resource prices. 
On top of this, (environmental) externalities are often ignored so that private costs 
in themselves were distorted reflections of social costs (see the next paragraph). In 
such cases, users the products of these sectors are paying less than the social 
costs their use gives rise to; they thus are induced to consume more than would 
be the case were the price corrected for social costs. Prices then give the wrong 
signals and the sector may expand to levels beyond what is socially desirable. 
Given the fairly rigid extent of the Environmental Utilization Space (at least: in 
the short run) we first look into some determinants of the processes leading to 
economie growth as an inherent and unchecked force potentially taking society 
beyond the boundaries of that space. Economie growth in itself may be beneficial 
for many obvious reasons. One problematic feature of it, however, is that it tends to 
take economies beyond what is ecologically sustainable in terms of the implied 
claims on natural resources and/or in terms of environmental pressures exerted 
through pollution, waste generation and ecosystems modification. However, 
economie growth consistent with the maintenance of environmental quality may be 
possible over some finite time horizon (Perrings 1990) and in many regions of the 
world. Ultimately, and depending on the rate of aggressiveness of economie 
growth, it is likely to become unsustainable and uncertain in its effects (Perrings 
1990b). As the manifestations of unsustainable use of the environment tend to be 
removed in time from the moment of their being generated, this growth tendency 
may remain unchecked or uncorrected for too long, leading to irreversible changes 
or changes that will be very costly to redress in future.One could refer to this as 
faiiure to manage the economie process. 
Other sources of government policy faiiure may be biases brought into the 
system of prices in consequence of taxation policies, notably the common practice 
of taxing incomes or expenditures in such a way that the relative scarcities between 
labour and other factors of production (especially environmental quality and natural 
resources) are no longer reflected. 
Market Faiiure 
Market failures have traditionally been defined as inefficiencies and injustices 
inherent in market forces operating under certain conditions such as imperfect 
competition, imbalances in the distributions of power and property rights, etc. 
Amongst the injustices referred to, is that of a skewed distribution of incomes, 
unfair wages, etc. Notorious classes of inefficiencies have to do with external 
effects and imperfect information. Under externalities we have learned since the late 
'60s to include environmental degradation. Market failures are defects in the market 
mechanism that lead the economie process away of what would be societally 
desirable.lt has long been established (Kapp 1950) that the economie process as 
directed by decentralized decision making based on market signals and compet'rtive 
behaviour, leads to 'cost shrfting' or 'displacement of costs' (Pearce and Turner 
1990; Opschoor 1989). That is: part of the adverse consequences of one actor's 
decision are passed on to others to bear. Economie activities lead to effects that 
are external to those who decide over these activities in the first place. In other 
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words, economie activities lead to social costs (including the costs of environmen-
tal degradation) that are not fully translated into private costs , or internalized into 
the private decision making mechanism. This practice of cost shifting is facilitated 
by what could be labelled as: the 'distance factor'. The consequences or effects of 
environmental degradation in relation to economie activities manifest themselves at 
often large distances from the source or agent causing them. This may be a 
distance both in terms of space and time (e.g., DDT in polar ice caps, chemical 
time bombs and climate change). Effects of environmental degradation are thereby 
shifted on to other people, to future people and even to other species. There is a 
third type of distance involved, namely that between the level of one's individual 
influence and the level at which a problem must be addressed for its solution. One 
could refer to this as: distance in scale. Single actors in a multi-actor context may 
face situations where their privately optimal behaviour may lead to socially or 
collectively undesirable overall outcomes (the 'prisoners' dilemma' in the case of 
very few actors, or the 'tragedy of the commons' in the case of many actors). 
Examples are: countries sharing a common resource, individual fishermen exploit-
ing a shared fish population, etc. In many cases, the absence of control and 
intervention by national or international authorities, leads to an irrational exploitation 
of a shared or common property resource, to ongoing pollution, etc. Distance 
between cause and effect - that is what combines these various situations. And if 
such distances facilitate cost shifting, then what is optimal from an individual per-
spective may not at all be optimal from a social or collective perspective. Where 
such distance factors prevails and the party on which the burden is shifted cannot 
counteract this distance by pressing his interest, government intervention is 
needed. This is quite obviously the case with a range of environmental problems. 
Reasons why these "extemal" interests are not adequately internalised, include: 
a) absence of legally based 'property and access rights' protecting the damaged 
party, or of liability/accountability regulations enforceable upon the causal agent; 
b) absence of means to exert 'countervailing power' (Galbraith) through the political 
system (lack of voting power as in cases of transboundary cost shifting, or inter-
temporal cost shifting, or cost shifting onto other species), or through the market 
place (i-e. lack of purchasing power). 
The various paradigms take different stances on how to deal with these 
forms of institutional failure: basically, the neoclassical school (including its environ-
mental branch) will argue in favour of an efficiency-oriented, market-conform 
approach, whereas its institutional/ecological counterpart will have doubts about 
the generality of that solution and are for regulation OF the market as well as for 
regulation VIA the market. 
III Economics and SD: some relevant paradigms 
111.1 Welfare 
Economics -whatever its specific inclination or paradigm- basically is about 
welfare: how it is generated and how it is distributed. Human welfare is defmed as 
the amount of satisfaction people derive from their expected levels of 'consumption' 
over time. It depends on the availability over time of an adequate supply of 
elements necessary to generate welfare: natural capital, produced capital and 
human capital. Other (pre)conditions for welfare generation include: a productive 
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distribution of knowledge and know how, and an institutional infrastructure capable 
of governing interactions and decisions related to welfare and the use of its various 
determinants. Welfare thus depends on environmental capital as well as on physical 
and human capital (in a way that is structured by the institutional context). These 
various forms of capital are more or less hierarchically related (e.g.maintenance 
and replacement of physical capital heavily depends on the size and composition 
of environmental capital; the extension of human capital is bounded by the availa-
bility of physical and natural capital; etc). To a certain degree, they can also be 
seen as substitutes for one another in terms of sources of flows of factors of 
production into a welfare generating process. Traditional economics (mainstream or 
'neoclassical' economics) studies the impact of physical (manmade) capital and 
(more recently) human capital on welfare. Neoclassical environmental economics 
reintroduced environmental capital as a third factor in the analysis, though at a 
usually very aggregated level (the environment as a single variable). A growing 
number of economists (e.g. Kapp, Norgaard, Daly) looks at society-environment 
interactions from an integrated and broader systems orientation. 
A second relationship between the biosphere and welfare is, that the state of 
the biosphere or of components of it, may in itself be a factor contributing to 
human welfare. Amenity values, naturalness of environments, ecosystems' integrity 
and biological diversity in general, may be perceived by people as factors influenc-
ing the way they feel about their living conditions. Hence, environmental quality may 
be a direct (through its immediate effect on the human state of mind) and an 
indirect (as an essential factor of production of welfare generating goods and 
services) contributor to welfare. Traditional economics would take this for granted 
as its normally takes preferences for granted, and calculate from this a 'demand' 
for environmental quality in terms of direct use and non-use values (see Pearce and 
Turner 1990). More 'ecologically' oriented economists put (economie) welfare in a 
hierarchy of values to consider, including continuity of life and well-being, and in 
such a view there may be non-economic values to be ascribed to especially the 
infrastructural aspects of the environment, which take precedence over whatever 
economie preferences may indicate (see below). 
Economie welfare thus may not be a sole criterion for deciding over environ-
mentally relevant options; nevertheless, it would most certainly be 'uneconomic' in 
principle to ignore the direct and indirect impacts environmental quality has on 
economie welfare. 
Hl.2 Paradioms 
In the economics literature on environmental problems one may discern a 
bundie of more or less fundamentally different approaches. In this paragraph we 
shall present 'snapshots' of several of them (not all), in black and white. This 
distorts the representation and I apologise for that to those who feel that I have 
twisted their ways of dealing w'rth environmental issues. 
A Neoclassical Economics basically operates from a stylised 'model' of 
society and humankind that may be captured by adjectives such as: mechanis-
tic/rationalistic, efficiency-oriented (i.e. allocation-focused, not: scale-focused). It 
assumes given preferences (often including preferences for future generations in an 
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'overlapping generations' function), and typically approaches environmental 
degradation as externalities stemming from decentralised decisions in a market (or 
market analogue) context. People and institutions behave rationally, they base their 
decisions on optimisation (in cost-benefit terms) given their preferences and 
lim'rtations to their means as provided by their economie and environmental 
contexts. Both in production and consumption activities, the typical approach is to 
consider that alternatives ways and means exist to arrive at a given end or to 
perform a certain function: substitution. Technological progress is assumed to 
affect these (production) functions and constraints; mostly this is regarded as an 
exogenous phenomenon. 
B. Neo-Austrian economics is a tradition that is much more explicit about the 
role of time in economie phenomena. Hence, intertemporal and dynamic aspects 
are normally treated much more carefully, but often at the expense of generality in 
outcomes predictions (compared with neoclassical economics). Also within this line 
of thinking technological innovation has been treated more realistically (e.g. by 
Neo-Schumpeterians) but with the same impact on predictive capacity. It is also 
typical to take intersectoral linkages into account much more, e.g. by using input-
output (fixed technical coefficients) models where their neoclassical counterparts 
would insist on modelling on the basis of substitutability. 
C. Modern evolutionary economics might perhaps be regarded as a hybrid 
of A and B. Formaüy, it uses models derived from chaos theory and behaviour 
under uncertainty. It is interested in forms of self-organisation emerging in disequi-
iibrium situations (where especially neoclassical economists tend to rely on more 
'conservative' equilibrium-seeking mechanisms. The influence of surprises is looked 
at seriously, and behaviour is seen as driven by local forces (both in space and in 
time): concepts such as 'selection environment' and 'learning' (eg, by trial and 
error) play a major role as determinants not only of innovation but also of behavi-
our. 
D. Institutional economics (and/or traditional evolutionary economics) sees 
the economie process as embedded in, and interacting with, a wider socio-political 
setting that cannot be ignored analytically as is typically done by neoclassicals. 
They come closest to the traditional 'political economy'-approach of classical 
economics, but have more interest in micro and meso processes. Like with the 
Neo-Austrians, the widening of the conceptual horizon has implied that less general 
results come out of the analyses. One typically employs non-mechanistic approa-
ches and allows for 'circular causation' between social and economie processes. 
Another feature is the much less reductionist approach to valuation: one operates 
on the basis of assumed 'value hierarchies'. 
E. Modern Institutional Economics is a hybrid of A and D. It studies changes 
in institutions by using methods derived from neoclassical (micro-)economics. 
There is an interest in property rights (and access rights), behaviour is often 
studied in terms of rent-seeking, institutional differentiation and the implications 
thereof are approached by principal-agent models based on asymmetry of informa-
tion/power assumptions, transaction costs are regarded as important mechanisms 
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in understanding frictions or divergencies between prima facie rational and factual 
behaviour, etc. 
F. Ecological economics is a relatively new school, drawing methodologicaliy 
on D, which is injected with concepts and theories from (bio)physics and ecology; it 
also borrows from C. The main point however is its openness to natural science 
and to realism and profoundness in the analysis (and modelling) of environmental 
phenomena. This means, that like other paradigms such as (B), C and D, it uses 
simulation models much more frequently than optimisation models. Also in its 
approach to values it draws on D, which means that it accepts value hierarchies 
and institutionalised bounds to the domain of 'economic'rationality and the scale of 
economie activity. In its normative branches it starts from sustainability-related 
ethics and searches for co-evolutionary 'ecodevelopment'. 
As A and B differ basically only in their treatment of time and their time 
horizon, we shall discuss only one of the two, i.e. the (dominant) neoclassical 
paradigm; the latter school will be traced to its offspring: neoclassical "environmen-
tal" economics. Of the alternative, 'politically' oriented schools I have selected the 
institutional/evolutionary paradigm (D); this in its environment-oriented branches, 
tends to develop by co-opting biophysical and ecological approaches from the 
natural sciences and to form an amalgam labelled "ecological" economics (F). 
Hence I shall treat these two together, as an alternative to neoclassical (environ-
mental) economics. 
Re A: NEOCLASSICAL ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: 
Neoclassical economics analyses what is regards as the economie aspect of 
human behaviour from a perspective that can be characterized by 4 premises: 
(i) the 'fixed context' premise: a large range of parameters is assumed to be fixed 
or 'given' including: (a) institutional arrangements (i.e. the economie system itself), 
(b) preferences and wants, (c) the state of technology (and its rate of change), (d) 
the state of the natural environment. Basically, this means that numerous relevant 
variables are left out of the analysis. Neoclassical economics is more interested in 
exchange relationships between different actors in situations of different factor 
endowments and is prepared to ignore in its main stream the realities a through d 
above. 
(ii) the 'maximization' premise on behaviour: this is the assumption that individuals 
and groups will try to maximize their objective function (i.e. utility or welfare for 
individuals, and profit for enterprises). Neoclassical economics assumes: a) that 
individuals independently form preferences reflecting individual values; b) that they 
behave and chose rationally, by taking their utility into account predominantly "rf not 
only, and c) that individual values are to count exclusively in all matters. Implicitly 
this often entails that individuals are assumed to be well informed about the 
alternatives in front of them. 
(iii) the 'weighing' premise on evaluation: this implies that all relevant changes as a 
consequence of economie choices, can be expressed in a welfare related, one 
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dimensional entity, so that these costs and benefits of all alternatives can be 
reduced to neat (ordinal) balance figures which can be ranked. Hence, all different 
types of value are to be projected into one single plane where they can be aggre-
gated into one dimensional entities such as 'utility', 'net benefit' or 'welfare'. 
(iv) the 'market optimality' premise: within certain boundary conditions, 
coordination of economie decisions and hence the development of the economie 
process, are assumed to best (in the sense of 'optimal') be institutionalized if run 
via the market mechanism. 
Thus, individuals separate out utility-related aspects of their behavioural 
options, they rationally calculate their costs and benefits and they chose accordin-
gly; their actions are 'coordinated' by a market mechanism that -indeed mechani-
cally- equates or equilibrates the consequences of these actions and decisions in 
terms of the exchanges they imply between the various members of society. The 
concern is with the efficiency of the social processes (i.e. markets): the more 
efficiënt, the greater the general welfare (apart from distributional issues). 
Mainstream economics has recognised that regulating market forces may be 
necessary when all conditions for efficiency are not met. Market failures may result 
from externalities and from common (open access) resources; both are typical of 
environmental and resource issues. The early answer to (environmental) externali-
ties was formulated by Pigou (1920): taxes or charges to equate marginal social 
costs and benefits. According to Coase, however, taxes are not necessary for ef-
ficiency. Coase proposed an approach centred around a negotiation or bargaining 
approach: if bargaining ('transaction') costs are low, parties will achieve an efficiënt 
solution. A third solution advanced by neoclassical economics was to allocate 
access and/or property rights to environmental quality and to resources, and to 
allow trading between those who wish to use or put pressure on the environmental 
resources and those who hold rights to those resources. Thus, environmental 
problems are basically seen as the results of market failure that -in cases of high 
transaction costs precluding bargaining solutions- necessitate interventions to 
correct for these failures: direct price interventions, or the creation of new markets 
through the rearranging of access/property rights. 
On efficiency grounds alone, it is already important that the socially optimal 
level of environmental degradation be established; this would require that (at the 
margin) efforts to prevent, m'rtigate or compensate environmental degradation 
equate the damage that would occur in the absence of such efforts. Hence the 
issue of valuation; premises ii and iii show the direction neoclassical environmental 
economics thinks in. Basically, damage is measured by the value lost by an 
environmental change: the sum of use values (to individuals) and nonuse values (to 
those alive today) at issue. 
In terms of the four premises discussed above, environmental economics 
has managed to partially relax the fixed context premise: interrelationships between 
economie activity, environmental quality and welfare are acknowledged and 
analyzed, but very much from a traditional point of view and as much as possible 
(or even more so) with resort to the conventional concepts. In terms of the market 
optimality premise neoclassical environmental economics has contributed largely by 
suggesting ways of remedying some sources of market failure, thereby enhancing 
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the potential efficiency of markets. 
Re D/F: institutional/Ecoloaical Environmental Economics 
In terms of the premises described above, institutional/ecological econo-
mics can be characterised as foliows: 
(i) 'Circular interdependence' replacing 'fixed context' 
Most neoclassical models fail as adequate descriptions of the institutional and 
biophysical realities which do- form the initial settings within which societies and 
hence economies develop. They have even been more insensitive to the interacti-
ons between the process of development and changes in these institutional and 
biophysical parameters. Often an elaborate analysis of the system as a whole is 
needed, if all relevant feedbacks are to be understood and dealt with. To do justice 
to these realities, the other subsystems must be described in terms of a reasonable 
model of the processes within them. Typical in the institutional approach is the 
incorporation of social and political variables, often in an historically based analysis. 
Typical of the ecological extension of this paradigm is that ecosystems and 
the relevant processes therein are modeled and analyzed in detail, and in explicit 
relation to economie activities and processes. Institutional and evolutionary 
economics basically reject a reductionist and mechanistic view and replace that by 
a more integrated (some even go as far as to advocate a 'holistic'), and develop-
mental or 'evolutionary' (sometimes labelled: 'organic') approach. The 'fixed 
context' premise is replaced by one of 'circular interdependence'. Circular interde-
pendence is incorporated by working from the notion of chains of triggering factors, 
causes, effects, responses, etc. that link the economy to environmental processes 
and structures. 
(ii) Behavioral pluriformity 
This implies that other, less rigid and strenuous approaches such as 'satisfying* 
assumptions may replace the optimisation/rationality assumption of neoclassical 
economics. Behaviour may be conventional (where of course trial and error or 
leaming may in the past have given rise to conventions that were and perhaps are 
optimal), the rationality of decision making may have been bounded by limitations 
on information, etc. 
(iii) Co-evolutionary Instrument Values 
Society as a whole is taken to have values that may deviate from individual values 
e.g. on the basis of society's much longer life expectancy or on that of a paterna-
listic concern over individuals' wellbeing beyond their own concerns. Valuation 
approaches from a neoclassical, individual based perspective, may hold in a certain 
domain, but cannot always generalized to statements on public goods and merit 
goods. Insfrtutionalists postulate the existence of a hierarchical value system. 
Beyond wants and welfare, they perceive 'values' as operators on human and 
societal behaviour. In assessing economie performances, insfrtutionalists may use 
as a criterion: the institutions' instrumental significance for realizing these deeper or 
more ultimate values such as "continuity of human life and community" (Swaney 
1987); notions such as 'sustainability' or 'environmental compatibility' can easily be 
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derived from these. In fact, a social value hierarchy could be postulated in which 
societies, with the support of the individuals in their capacities as 'citizens' opt for 
social states that cannot be deduced as optimal from their market behaviour. 
Institutional or evolutionary economics thus typically employs an ethical approach 
biased towards values expressed in terms of 'rights' rather than 'utilitarian theories'. 
In terms of Standard welfare theoretical analysis, this means that one postulates a 
third criterion, in addition to efficiency and equity, nameiy that of co-evolutionary 
sustainability. 
(iv) Regulation and Markets 
Kapp (1950 and 1974) has argued that the phenomenon of 'extemalities' is 
endemic and pervasive within any society with decentralized decision making, 
including market economies. In such economies the 'shifting of costs' to others 
than those causing them, is an institutionalized form of behaviour to be expected 
by e.g. firms, as it is rewarded by competitive success. Kapp's theorem of 'cost 
shifting' was a fundamental critique of the 'extemalities' analysis of the neoclassical. 
Markets are institutional arrangements associated with externalizing ('cost shifting') 
behaviour. Solutions to that are often to be found beyond market structures. 
"Market mechanism conformity' therefore cannot be a criterion for judging the 
adequacy of new environmental policy instruments. The market mechanism itself 
should be judged instrumentally, in terms of its consequences. Efficiency is not 
necessarily the result of market processes alone, and concern over sustainability 
may factually imply the need to resort to other mechanisms. Institutional economics 
boks at the institutions and instruments of environmental policy in a much broader 
context than does neoclassical economics. Not only is there an explicit interest in 
the evolution and operation of non-market instruments in addition to market 
instruments, but also there is scope for an assessment of instruments in much 
more than its efficiency aspects: Their emergence and evolution is studied in 
relation to aspects such as: conformity with policy trends, administrative traditions. 
etc. Also in terms of institutions, the scope is wider: property rights, cooperative 
rather than competitive organizational strategies, environmental impact assessment 
and evaluation, societal decision making on investments, projects and policies, etc. 
Hl.3 An Assessment 
From the above résumés of several paradigms within economics, one could 
derive the following picture (in primary colours only and maximising contrast!!): 
neoclassical/environmental institutional /ecoloaical 
economics economics 
reductionist integrative 
mechanistic organic/evolutionary 
allocation/efficiency-oriented sustainability/scale oriented 
equity as relevant side effect inequity as driving force 
valuation: v-oriented sensitive to (s.m)-values 
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In terms of their ability and sufficiency in addressing crucial environmental 
questions the two paradigms clearly take different perspectives on the role of future 
generations and other stake holders, they differ in their openness to biophysical 
and ecological detail, socio-contextual variety (culture, demography, technology) 
and institutional change. 
From the above, it may appear that environmental economics is less 
appealing when it comes to addressing environmental and development issues, as 
its effective domain is clearly narrower than that of the alternative. To be quite frank 
on this, however, the following observations must be made: 
1) A reductionist approach with a narrower domain leads to sometimes deep 
and sharp analyses, where other approaches apparently remain shallower, less 
pronounced, casuistic. As the above makes clear, there is a price attached to the 
apparent transparency and lucidity of the former approach. 
2) What has been discussed here as institutional/ecological economics is in 
fact a rather loose set of approaches paying homage in various degrees to the 
institutional and/or ecological aspects related to development, whereas neoclassi-
cal environmental economics appears to be a much more internally coherent 
approach, albeit abstract and top down. 
3) We have compared here an established tradition (i.e. that of neoclassical 
environmental economics, going back to at least 1967) with an emerging one. Or, 
we have compared actual performance in one approach, with what basically are 
not much more than potentials or intentions in ecological economics. 
4) In real world issues, sometimes one and sometimes the other of the two 
paradigms could provide an apparently appropriate tooi kit (Klaassen and 
Opschoor 1991); one should not, I think, dogmatically set up one against the other 
In terms of the arguments put forward at the practical level of what is to be 
sustained and how to achieve that, the neoclassical position explicitly expresses 
much faith in the mechanism of substitution between the various kinds of capital, 
and the market mechanism to realise efficiency. They express rather high hopes in 
technological progress which they think will outrun depletion and provide us with 
the means to cheaply remedy or prevent pollution; this innovation may even come 
automatic, with economie growth if economie agents act rationally and with good 
foresight. Meanwhile, they express their love for future generations and other 
species through their present assessments of existence values and preferences for 
future welfare in an overlapping generations function. Solow (1986) states that the 
present generation does not owe to posterity a certain share in the stock of 
environmental capital, but rather: "access to a certain Standard of living or level of 
consumption", disregarding the form in which this access is handed over: mineral 
deposits, capital goods, knowledge. Such notions however, risk becoming uncove-
red cheques on future possibilities, and a laissez passer for over exploitation of 
natural resources: these views disregard the hierarchical structure within which 
these forms of capital are related. In fact we know very little about substitutability 
between natural capital and produced (physical or human) capital; a cautious 
approach may be appropriate here. 
Again in an attempt to provide a maximum of contrast, I suggest that 
the institutional/ecological paradigm appears to put its faith very much in the power 
of societies (either through governments or on the basis of social movements) to 
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curb economie processes and even to constrain rent seeking and accumulative 
activities by economie agents. There also is faith in the possibiiities of innovation, if 
triggered by other forces than short term profitability on the market. The hope 
appears to be related to the pace at which society will move in the direction of 
sustainability compared with the rate of environmental destruction. In terms of love I 
hesitate to characterise ecological economists other than their neoclassical 
counterparts, though perhaps the inclination to think on the basis of an ecocentrist 
approach is found more amongst the former. 
IV Economie Paradigms and the Operationalisation of SD 
Sustainability is a notion that is extremely difficult to operationalise; par. 11.3 
discussed some of the conceptual issues in regard of this. This is not really an 
argument against using the phrase, however, for at least three reasons: (i) econo-
mics nas always used (and even based itself on) fuzzy concepts, e.g. 'welfare' 
'utility', 'capital' - all basically unmeasurable and even undefined; (ii) the concept 
has served to reopen the debate on environment and development globally, and 
that is -literally- of vital importance; (iii) there is no alternative phrase for opening 
up economie analysis and decision making for ecological realities. 
Sustainable development is an ambiguous phrase: it points at certain 
qualities of the development process (e.g. its ecological viability and social feasibili-
ty) and at the same time it is clear that we are searching for a process that will 
eventually put the economy on a sustainable track: development towards sustaina-
bility. In the paragraphs below I shall attempt to indicate what the different para-
digms might have to suggest in relation to more specific recommendations on each 
of these two aspects: (a) what do they say about indicators for sustainability, and 
(b) what do they suggest in terms of instruments to eventually achieve sustainabili-
ty. 
IV. 1 Indicators 
Environmental economics in first instance attempts to value environmental 
change. In terms of the nature of this valuation, it is clear that individual preferences 
of the present generation are taken as the reference: the v's of Par.ll.5 above. 
These v's include use values, option values (for possible future use) and nonuse 
values such as 'existence values'; together they form the Total Economie Value'. 
Ultimately, these values could be made explicit by asking people their willingness to 
pay for certain changes in environmental quality. Contained within total economie 
value is the use value which may or may not correspond with the market value of 
environmental changes. The latter would be closest to conventional applied 
economics; total economie value, however, would be a more appropriate measure 
in principle, according to welfare economics. 
Related to sustainable development and the infrastructure or capital appro-
ach to it, this means that as much as possible economie or monetary values are 
attached to changes in the levels of specific environmental stocks or assets. In a 
weak sustainability setting, the net total (present) value of the changes in environ-
mental assets, if negative, should be compensated by the (positive) savings or 
investment rate in the economy for the total capital stock to at least remain 
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constant. More sophisticated analyses might allow for population growth in these 
indicators by expressing them on a per capita basis, where relevant. There is a 
debate as to whether in determining present values of flows of changes over time 
one should, in the case of environmental degradation use a discount rate different 
from the current social rate of discount; the dominant position now appears to be 
that this should not be done but, rather, that attempts be intensified to find better 
monetary values for these future changes and to constrain development paths from 
adversely and irreversibly affecting life support systems, environmental quality and 
biodiversity. 
In terms of macro economie indicators the above reasoning leads to 
attempts to correct the System of National Accounts so as to reflect and incorpora-
te the monetary de- or appreciations of environmental capital, and to eventually 
come up with environmentally corrected estimates of Gross Domestic Product. 
Such corrected GDP-measures are very easily taken to at least be adequate 
proxies for calculating whether development is sustainable in the sense of Pearce: 
non-declining welfare per capita with corrected GDP being substituted for welfare. 
The main focus of neoclassical economics is on efficiency, or perhaps: on 
efficiency within boundaries set by weak sustainability. That orientation combined 
with the 'market (near-)optimality'-premise induces an interest in monitoring market 
failures, e.g. taxes and subsidies implicit in factual market prices that are influenced 
by sectoral policies (such as in the fields of energy, transportation and agriculture). 
Institutional/ecological economics would, to begin with, take a much wider 
approach to valuing environmental change. It would put economie preferences for 
the environment as expressed by e.g. market values or even 'willingness to pay' in 
the wider context of value hierarchies which may imply constraints on the scope of 
lower level values. Continued human life and community override economie values 
and this could be taken to imply that the environmental infrastructure should 
essentially be passed on in at least the state it is in presently. This means that in 
this perspective or paradigm more significance is attached to values to be ascribed 
to other stakeholders (e.g. future generations) than can be derived from revealed 
utility functions. There are certain (though perhaps not very precise) boundaries to 
the domain and scope of economie valuation on neoclassical grounds (e.g. 
Hoevenagel and Opschoor 1991), having to do with the degree to which people 
can be taken to be informed, the relevance of their current assessments of future 
states of the environment, the scale of the environmental change that needs 
valuing, the degree to which the current generation and the total set of stakehol-
ders overlap. 
In so far as macro economie approaches are concerned, the reservations 
about valuation expressed above and the general openness to the diverseness of 
ecological realities both lead to an interest in accounting environmental change (in 
terms of infrastructure, resources and flows of goods and services) in physical 
terms, so that the factual developments in the state of the environment is monitored 
directly, rather than subsumed in 'welfare' or 'total capital' indicators. Given the 
interest in a range of determinants of social and individual welfare, performance 
indicators for economie development would look far beyond economie welfare as 
measured in GDP, and include some aggregate environmental quality indices as 
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well as indices for social quality (cf. UNDP's "Human Development Index, UNDP 
1991). In an ecological perspective, priority must be given to indicators that provide 
early warning to societies on the long term trends in their ecological infrastructures: 
indicators for ecosystems' 'health', resource regeneration and productivity, and 
indicators reflecting trends in relation to driving forces of unsustainability: population 
levels, environmental claims per capita, changes in environmental impacts of 
products and technologies, etc. 
Given its openness to social and politica! aspects, in an institutional/ecologic 
approach indicators are advocated and developed to measure (changes in) rights 
of access to and/or property of environmental resources and environmental quality, 
as well as their distributions. This concern with equity holds for national as well as 
for international indicators; in both cases there are links with what has been called 
'ecological security' and that is one aspect of sustainability. 
IV.2 Policy Instruments and Evaluation 
The main questions in relation to instruments are: which (combinations) of 
instruments provide effective and efficiënt signals so as to arrive in time at a 
maximum sustainable development path. These signals will have to induce a 
cleaner and leaner economy: less pollution and waste and lower levels of material 
and energetic inputs into production and consumption. Depending on one's 
position vis-a-vis substitutability, absolute limits to environmental pressure will be 
regarded as relevant: the issue of the 'scale' of economie activities in relation to the 
carrying capacity comes up, as well as that of the preservation of specific aspects 
of the environmental infrastructure or life support systems. Basically, the 'scale'-
issue as raised by Daly is nothing but the inverse of the problem of environmental 
utilisation space: the scale of the economy shouid qualitatively and quantitatively be 
in line with the environmental utilisation space or carrying capacity. 
Market-oriented economists will tend to basically look at efficiency aspects of 
instruments, and favour charges and tradable rights as market-compatible approa-
ches to reduce pollution, waste and/or inputs. They also have an interest in the 
property rights aspects behind market failure, albeit a fairly abstract interest, with a 
bias in favour of private property. 
Ecological economists tend to be concerned with issues of scale, impressed 
as they are by the uncertainties about substitutability of produced for natural 
resources, irreversibility of biodiversity loss, etc. Notwithstanding their acknowledge-
ment of the efficiency aspects, they are more focused on effectiveness issues and 
this generates an interest in other instruments such as zoning, standards, quanti-
tative or volume-oriented instruments capable of curbing certain economie activities, 
etc. Moreover, they appear to often have a more profound interest in specific 
institutional reforms in terms of access and/or property rights, both private and 
communal. 
On tools for evaluation of projects, programmes and policies, the two 
approaches discerned here differ as well. 
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Quite consistent with its internal structure, neoclassical environmental 
economics would recommend a cost-benefit framework, making use of a range of 
innovative (but not all embracing) valuation techniques as reviewed above; it would 
be recognised that sometimes constraints on the applicability of this framework 
might necessitate other techniques, e.g. multicriteria analysis (see e.g. James 
1994). 
Ecological economists often are biased in one of two other directions: (i) 
using other units of measurement, e.g. energy-related measures as somehow 
reflecting embodied ecological costs, or (ii) applying multi-criteria evaluation tools 
(coupled with some weighting of the various dimensions) in order to do justice to 
the complexities inherent in those programmes etc; wherever possible and 
admissible using aggregation devices in order to limit the number of dimensions 
with which alternatives are to be presented. 
V Conclusions 
This paper has attempted to relate a number of paradigms or perspectives in 
economics to the notion of 'sustainable development' (SD) and how this notion is 
(to be) operationalised. Economie development was defined as sustainable if: (i) 
the environmental impacts in consequence of it do not impair the functioning of 
resource regeneration systems, waste absorption systems and the systems sup-
porting flows of other environmental services and goods, and (ii) when use of 
nonrenewable resources is compensated for by at least equivalent increases in 
supplies of renewable or reproducible substitutes. Sustainability thus defined means 
that, ceteris paribus, the interactions between the economy and the ecology can be 
continued qualitatively and quantitatively at least the current levels. The economy 
remains within its "environmental utilization possibilities frontier", or environmental 
utilization space. Even thus defined, the specific content of 'sustainable develop-
ment' remains unclear. This is so not only because of uncertainties in the 
stochastic sense or as a result of lack of knowledge, but this is so also because 
several normative elements will enter into any discussion on sustainability (par. II.3). 
The notion of an EUS suggests the need to develop in operational terms a 
corresponding set of (physical) sustainability indicators, and it entails the need to 
search for strategies and instruments that curb the levels of economie activities to 
remain within the EUS. 
Sustainability, however defined and operationalised, may entail the need to 
drastically rethink about phenomena that have become 'normal' in the various 
cultures, such as ever expanding material consumption or economie growth in 
general, and population expansion. In view of equity aspects, sustainability implies 
a preferential treatment of the poor in terms of their enhanced access to the 
environmental utilisation space. 
From the above it is clear that sustainability is a value-loaded concept. 
Values can be perceived differently in different paradigms, political and cultural 
settings. One important mechanism for disclosing values is the market mechanism. 
Given the almost exclusive role attached to that mechanism in this respect, it is 
important observe that it fails, almost by definition, in generating correct signals in 
terms of values at stake. The various economie paradigms discussed here take 
different stances on this. 
Behind unsustainability there are some structural causal mechanisms at 
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work, including institutional failure: it can be attributed to several kinds of failures in 
the decision making processes, such as government failures and market failures 
(par. 11.5). The various paradigms take different stances on how to deal with these 
forms of institutional failure as well. 
At least six different approaches ('paradigms') to economie and environmen-
tal realities can be discerned and they have been outlined(par. 111.2). From these, 
two have been selected for elaboration and to tracé backgrounds to a range of 
differences in opinion on unsustainability and how to measure or address it: 
neoclassical environmental economics, and ecological economics as a 
multidisciplinary blend of institutional and evolutionary approaches. Par. 11.3 
summarises the contrasts between these two paradigms. They do differ in terms of: 
(i) points of departure (deductive and reductionist, versus inductive and integrated), 
(ii) methodologies (analytical approaches versus simulation, optimisation oriented 
versus 'satisfying', etc); they also differ in terms of (iii) operational recommenda-
tions (eg, on indicators and instruments). 
Does one have to make choices between these paradigms? There are 
several reasons to be careful in this respect. 
To begin with, looking at these paradigms as phenomena that emerge and 
evolve in a process of development of thinking about problems, one can see that in 
the course of this development hybrids may be formed that actually mix qualities 
that hitherto appeared fundamentally different. 
Second, paradigmatic dogmatism makes for simplistic and/or biased 
analysis. "If one only has a hammer, one looks at every problem as though It is a 
nail"; however, environmental issues and development issues are multifaceted, 
multilevel, multicausal phenomena that may need approaches from more than one 
perspective. "Different tooi kits for different problems": the various paradigms may 
have comparative advantages in dealing with different practical problems or with 
issues at different levels or time scales. One ought to be pragmatic rather than 
dogmatic about this. 
Finally, at the operational level the two approaches CAN be analyzed as 
leading to complementary recommendations, as was clear in Section 4. This is 
another reason for being pragmatic rather than dogmatic about environmental/eco-
logicai economics. On indicators and instruments it appears wise, from a sustaina-
ble development interest, to not restrict policy recommendations to the concerns, 
approaches and results of neoclassical environmental economics. 
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